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Abstract
Traditional cryptography is under huge threat along of the evolution of
quantum information and computing. In this paper, we propose a new
post-quantum voting scheme based on physical laws by using encrypted no-
key protocol to transmit message in the channel, which ensures the post-
quantum security. Unlike lattice-based and multivariate-based electronic vot-
ing schemes, whose security is based on the computational problems assump-
tion that has not been solved by effective quantum algorithms until now, the
security of the voting scheme based on the physical laws is depended on in-
herent limitations of quantum computers and not influenced by the evolution
of new quantum algorithms. In detail, we also rigorously demonstrate that
the scheme achieves the post-quantum security and all properties necessary
for voting scheme such as the completeness, robustness, privacy, eligibility,
unreusability, fairness, and verifiability.
Keywords: voting scheme, no-key protocol, post-quantum security
1. Introduction
The voting scheme on the internet has been studied in recent decades.
Since it is an attractive aspect of cryptography, there has been a lot of crypto-
∗Corresponding author email: yangli@iie.ac.cn
graphic voting schemes, which aim at achieving security and privacy simul-
taneously. Chaum proposed the first electronic voting scheme [1] in 1981.
The scheme uses public key cryptography and pseudonyms rosters to con-
ceal voters identity, but does not ensure the privacy. Over the years, there
have been many electronic voting schemes. Those schemes are divided into
three categories: (1) The voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption
[2, 3, 4, 5] (2) The voting schemes based on the Mix-net [6, 7, 8, 9] (3) The
voting schemes based on blind signature [10, 11, 12]. However, so far, al-
most existing traditional voting schemes have been easily compromised by
quantum algorithms[13], whose security assumption based on the classical
assumption is integer factoring or discrete logarithm security assumption .
Therefore, proposing voting schemes based on the cryptographic algo-
rithm that can resist quantum adversaries is an important issue. In order
to achieve the goal, constructing a cryptographic algorithm that can resist
quantum adversaries has become of general interest in recent years. The
algorithms resisting quantum adversaries are divided into two categories as
follows. One is based on quantum computing and quantum communica-
tion, belonging to quantum cryptography. There are some quantum voting
schemes[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20] inspired by quantum cryptography. How-
ever, The overall system of quantum communication is not as complete as
traditional communication. At present, it seems be more expensive and com-
plicated than the traditional. The other is based on classical computing en-
vironment, which is as usual called post-quantum cryptography [21]. There
are some voting schemes [22, 23, 24] based on the hard problems based on
lattice, multivariate linear equations and other computational problems. We
have not found an effective quantum algorithm to solve the difficult prob-
lem of the above-mentioned post-quantum security cryptographic algorithm
until now. We can call this “passive defense” against quantum adversaries.
With the developing with quantum computing and algorithm, they may be
compromised by new quantum algorithms proposed [25, 26, 27]. Therefore,
facing the quantum adversaries, we have to consider defending them actively.
Based on the above viewpoint, we can construct the voting schemes based
on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms along another line. We can move
the focus from passive defense to active defense, and study the characteris-
tics of quantum computers and it’s internal defects, which are based on the
inherent physical laws. Since the quantum computer is a physical system, its
gate operation rate is limited by some basic physical parameters. Thus, we
can construct cryptographic algorithms to be post-quantum based on phys-
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ical limitations. Some of these algorithms such as encrypted key exchange
protocol (EKE) [28] and encrypted no-key protocol(ENK) [29] based on the
above viewpoint were proposed , whose security is based on the physical laws
which depends on inherent limitations of quantum computers. Due to the
inherent physical laws, the security is not influenced by the evolution of new
quantum algorithms.
On the above-mentioned viewpoint, we propose a voting scheme with
post-quantum security based on physical laws, which is inspired by the ENK
protocol with the post-quantum security [29]. [29] demonstrated the post-
quantum security from respective of the physical laws, where the authors
showed the lower limit of the time cost when the discrete algorithm of the
ENK protocol is calculated for one cycle. Specifically, we use the ENK pro-
tocol to transmit message in the channel, which ensures the post-quantum
security. And the message authentication code (MAC) [30] is introduced to
prevent the messages from being tampered with by any party of our scheme
and outsiders. With the help of administrator, voters can pass their ballots
to counter anonymously in our scheme. Meanwhile, nobody can trace the
ballots and match the voter’s identity with the ballot. In addition, any party
of our scheme can verify the validity of the ballot. These security properties
are all based on the inherent physical laws of quantum computers, which are
not relevant to the evolution of new quantum algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the ENK protocol with post-quantum security and analyze its post-
quantum security based on the physical laws. In Sect.3, we present our
voting scheme in detail. Subsequently, we analyze the security of the scheme
in Sect.4. Then we make a discussion about the aspects of the practical
post-quantum security in Sect.5. Finally, we make a conclusion in Sect.6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we review the encrypted no-key protocol and its post-
quantum security analysis based on physical laws, which will be used in the
voting scheme.
2.1. Encrypted No-key Protocol
The encrypted no-key protocol [29] will be used in our scheme to en-
sure the post-quantum security, which is developed from the Shamir no-key
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protocol[31]. In a no-key protocol, the sender and the receiver do not ex-
change any keys. However the protocol requires the sender and receiver to
have two private keys for encrypting and decrypting messages. The following
properties are required for the no-key protocol.
1. The algorithm in no-key protocol ia based on exponentiation modulo
a large prime as both the encryption function E(∗) and decryption
function D(∗). That is
E(e,m) = me mod p, (1)
D(d,m) = md mod p, (2)
where p is a large prime, m is any message, e is any encryption exponent
and d is the corresponding decryption exponent.
2. For any encryption exponent e in the range 1..p− 1, there is
gcd(e, p− 1) = 1. (3)
3. The corresponding decryption exponent d is chosen such that
de ≡ 1 (mod p− 1). (4)
It follows from Fermat’s Little Theorem that
D(d, E(e,m)) = mdemodp = m. (5)
4. The Shamir No-key protocol has the desired commutativity property
since
E(a, E(b,m)) = mabmodp = mbamodp = E(b, E(a,m)). (6)
It is relatively easy to know that the Shamir no-key protocol does not ensure
the post-quantum security and resist man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. The
[29] proposed the ENK protocol, in which both parties pre-share a password
P before no-key communication, where P is used for resisting the quantum
adversaries and the MIM attack. The protocol is presented here.
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Encrypted No-key Protocol
1. Alice randomly chooses a message M and a secret number a, then
she calculates a−1 (mod q − 1) and sends EP (M
a mod q) to Bob;
2. Bob randomly chooses a secret number b, decrypts with P and sends
EP (M
ab mod q) to Alice;
3. Alice calculates M b mod q = ((Ma)b)(a
−1 mod q−1)mod q , and sends
EP (M
b mod q) to Bob;
4. Bob decrypts EP (M
b mod q) to recover M.
2.2. The Post-quantum Security of Encrypted No-key Protocol
The post-quantum security of ENK protocol in ref.[29] is specifically ana-
lyzed from the perspective of physical limitation. We know that the discrete
logarithm (DL) is used in the ENK protocol. And if quantum adversaries
use Shor algorithm to solve the DL problem, it requires a large number of
controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate operations [33]. The CNOT gate operations is
limited by CNOT gate operation times and maximum number of operations
for various candidate physical realizations of interacting systems of quantum
bits. One is CNOT gate operation times and maximum number of opera-
tions. Since the qubits consisting of CNOT gates use phonons to interact
with other collective excitation particles that are far apart from each other,
the efficiency of quantum computer operations are limited by the movement
speed of phonon or other medium. Therefore, there is a lower limit of the
time cost when the discrete algorithm of the ENK protocol is calculated for
one cycle, depending on the operating time of a single CNOT gate and the
number of CNOT gates. The other is candidate physical realizations of quan-
tum computers. If the quantum adversary Eve wants to know the messages
which are transmitted by the ENK protocol, she must make a password-
guessing attack. Whenever the adversary guesses the candidate password,
she uses Shor algorithm to calculate the DL problem once. If the length of
the password is n, she uses Shor algorithm to calculate the DL problem 2n
times. The total time required for the attack is so long for Eve that it is
unrealistic.
Specifically, for the ENK protocol, the attacker based on some universal
parameters of single-qubit quantum gate operations Eve wants to get the
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message of communication. She can do a password-guessing attack. For
each guessing password P ′, Eve should perform the discrete logarithm once.
Let the lower bound of the time cost in the discrete logarithm calculation
cycle be ∆T1, the time to perform a basic quantum logic operation be ∆t1 and
the number of quantum gates serialized in the discrete logarithm algorithm
be N1. Then the time of a discrete logarithm computing cycle ∆T1 will be
∆T1 = N1 ·∆t1. (7)
It is well known that ∆t1 has a lower bound:∆t1 ≥ 10
−14. The value of N1
determines the computational speed of the discrete logarithm algorithm in a
quantum computer. From the ref.[29], the rough estimate of the lower bound
is 104, so we can get a discrete logarithm of the lower bound of time:
∆T1 ≥ 10
4 ·∆t1 ≥ 10
4 · 10−14 = 10−10. (8)
In the real physical world, we consider that the continuous attack duration is
232(100 years). Let the number of times that the quantum adversary needs
to crack the password within the effective attack duration be N , we have
N <
232
10−10
< 266. (9)
For each candidate P ′, the length of the password P should satisfy |P | ≥
66. That is, for resisting attack with several quantum computers, a 68-bit
password is enough to ensure the security of an ENK within the effective
attack duration in the real physical world.
The above analysis is based on some common parameters of the single
qubit gate operation. Compared with the ion-trap quantum computer[34], it
is easy to know that the computational power of the adversary using an ion
trap computer is stronger than that of a single qubit gate operation based
on common parameters. The ion-trap is one of the earliest implementations
of quantum computer and has a series of advancements in implementing
the Shor algorithm. In recent years, it is considered to be one of the most
promising physical implementations of quantum computer. For adversaries
with an ion-trap computer, she also do a password-guessing attack. For each
guessing password P ′, Eve should perform the discrete logarithm once. Let
the the lower bound of time finishing a discrete logarithm computation be
∆T2, the time that a CNOT operation performs be ∆t2 and the number of
CNOT operations performing serially bek N2. By analyzing the relationship
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between frequency, the wavelength of the acoustic wave and the mass of
every ion, we can have ∆t2 ≈ 2.85 × 10
−4. Due to ref.[35], we can get
N2 ∼ (log n). In view of the fault-tolerant structure of ion trap quantum
computers, especially the error correction coding related to the threshold
theorem of concatenated quantum, we know that
N2 > 10
2, (10)
then we have
∆T2 = N2 ·∆t2 ≥ 2.85× 10
−2, (11)
Although the physics parameters other types of quantum computer are dif-
ferent, the conclusion is similar. In the real physical world, we consider that
the continuous attack duration is 232(100 years). Within one second, the
ion trap quantum computer can not do the discrete logarithm calculation
26, so the attacker can not perform the discrete logarithm calculation 238
times within the effective attack duration. Assuming that the size of a quan-
tum computer is about one square meter, the upper limit of the number of
quantum computers used by any adversary is
4π × (6370× 103)2 = 5.1× 1014 < 249. (12)
Let the number of times that the quantum adversary needs to crack the
password within the effective attack duration be N , we have
N < 287. (13)
When the length of password P is 88, the quantum adversary must solve the
algorithm 287 times on average, which is beyond the maximum computational
power of the attacker within the effective attack duration for these quantum
computers. For more detailed argument of the security, we refer the readers
to [29].
3. The Voting Scheme
3.1. Notations of the Voting Scheme
The roles in the scheme are voters Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), administrator A and
counter C. With the help of administrator, voters can pass their ballots to
counter anonymously. The notations involved in the scheme are described in
table.1.
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Notation Description
‖ concatenation of two bit strings
Bi The ballot of Vi
ℓ Candidate set
Vi Voteri who has legal voting right
IDi Identification number string of Vi
IDj Replaced identification number string of Vi
Si a unique verification string corresponding to IDi
Pavi The password of Vi and A’s ENK protocol
Kva The key shared by all voters and A
Ka an authentication key of A and C
Pac The password of A and C’s ENK protocol
Kvc The key shared by all voters and C
Pvc The password of all voters and C’s ENK protocol
acvi The random key generated by Vi performing ENK protoocl with C
bcvi The random key generated by C performing ENK protoocl with Vi
hK

() The MAC of () encrypted with K
Xi Bi‖Si‖hKva(Bi‖Si)
Yi Xi‖hKvc(Xi)
E∗K

[] The Symmetric encryption algorithm with K()
EP

[] The ENK protocol with P()
Table 1: Notations of the voting scheme
3.2. Construction of the Voting Scheme
We present the voting scheme in detail in this section. First, administra-
tor A publishes a candidate set, distributes an ID for the voter to show the
legal identity and pre-processes the keys required for the voting. Then voter
sends the voting request to A, which contains voter’s ID and encrypted bal-
lot. After authentication, A helps the authenticated voter to pass the ballot
to counter C using the ENK protocol. Among them, the ballot information is
encrypted by the double-encryption and voter’ID is replaced by another ID,
so as to ensure the security of the election. Finally, the ballots are counted
and the results are published by C. The model of of the voting scheme is
described in the following Figure.1.
The voting scheme consists of initial phase, authentication and voting
phase, delivering ballot phase and publishing ballot phase. The structure of
of the voting scheme is following.
Initial phase: Candidates are opened; Keys are preprocessed.
Authentication and voting: Voters pass authentication and start voting.
Delivering ballot phase : A helps voters deliver ballots.
Publishing ballot phase: C publishes the voting result.
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Figure 1: The Flow diagram of the voting scheme. We can take voter Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as an
example. With the help of administrator, voter can pass his encrypted ballot information,
Yi, to counter anonymously, where Yi consist of Bi, Si and hKva(Bi‖Si). Then C records it
and announces the voting result in final. The notations’ description of the model is shown
in detail in Table.1 on the above.
We use the ENK protocol to pass ballot information to ensure the post-
quantum security. To prevent ballot information from being tampered, we
use the unconditionally secure MAC. There are a lot of unconditionally secure
MACs; for instance, [32]. We do not specify which MAC is exact to be used
for the scheme. We use ID substitution operation to ensure the privacy of
voters. Because of this operation, even if C gets ID, he does not know the
exact corresponding voting identity. The specific scheme is as follows:
Phase I: Initial
In the initial phase, firstly voting candidate set is announced. Then the
communication keys required for the voting scheme are pre-distributed and
the communication identity strings about voters and A are pre-shared. The
steps in initial phase are as follows:
1. The voting candidate set is announced.
Supposing there are m candidates, there is a candidate set.
ℓ = {B1,B2,B3, ...,Bm}.
Each element of the set is an s-bit string that represents an eligible
candidate, i.e. Bj ⊆ {0, 1}s(j ∈ [1, m]). The administrator announces
the set ℓ and each candidate corresponding to the s-bit string. We
assume s is large enough to ensure that the probability is negligible
where a random s-bit string is an element of set ℓ. For an eligible voter
Vi, he chooses one candidate as his ballot Bi.
2. The necessary preparations for voting are completed.
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(1). Preparations between voters and administrator
Each eligible voter Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) has a bunch of numbers IDi that
represents voter’s identity, which is distributed by A. Each voter Vi and
A pre-distribute a password Pavi , which is used for the ENK protocol.
In addition, all voters and A pre-distribute a communication key Kva,
which is used to encrypt voter’s ID. These are shown in Table.2.
(2). Preparations between administrator and counter
A and C pre-distribute a password Pac , which is used for the ENK
protocol. In addition, they also pre-distribute a communication key
Kac, which is used to encrypt voter’s ID. These are also shown in
Table.2.
(3).Preparations between voters and counter
All voters and C pre-distribute a password Pvc , which is used for the
ENK protocol. In addition, they also pre-distribute a communication
key Kvc, which is used to encrypt voter’s ID. These are also shown in
Table.2.
Both sides of communication Preprocessed key information
Vi & A Kva, Pavi
A & C Kac, Pac
Vi & C Kvc, Pvc
Table 2: The preprocessed keys
Phase II: Authentication and Voting
In this phase, voters who want to vote should be authenticated. If Vi is a
legal voter, he can pass the authentication with a valid ID and transmit the
encrypted ballot information to A, where the encrypted ballot information
can prevent from being tampered with; A stores Vi’ information into the
database and gets a voters’ information table passing authentication. We
take the specific voter Vi as an example, then the steps in authentication and
voting phase are as follows:
1. Vi chooses his ballot and generates the unique verification string corre-
sponding to IDi.
Vi chooses Bi as his own ballot and generates a unique verification
string Si. where Si is the unique verification string corresponding to
IDi. In addition, |Si| is large enough to ensure that the probability of
generating a same string is negligible.
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2. Vi generates encrypted ballot information.
To prevent Bi‖Si from being tampered, Vi generates a message authen-
tication code for Bi‖Si using Kva, where Kva is the key shared by all
voters and A. To simplify the following, we do the definition.
Xi , Bi‖Si‖hKva(Bi‖Si), (14)
Yi , Xi‖hKvc(Xi), (15)
where hKva(Bi‖Si) is the MAC of Bi‖Si with the key Kva to prevent
from being tampered with, Kvc is the key shared by all voters and C
and hKvc(Xi) is the MAC of Xi.
Each voter Vi’ encrypted ballot information is double-encrypted as fol-
lows:
EPavi [EPvc [Y
acvi
i ],
where, the inner layer is encrypted by Pvc, which is used for the ENK
communication between each voter and C and the outer layer is en-
crypted by Pavi , which is used for the ENK communication between
each voter Vi and C. Due to the inner layer encrypted by Pvc , it
ensures that A is invisible for the encrypted ballot information.
3. Vi transmits the encrypted ballot information to A and finishes the
authentication.
Vi transmits the encrypted ballot information to A.
Vi
(E∗
Kva
[IDi], EPavi
[EPvc [Y
acvi
i
]])
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A,
where IDi is the legal voters identification number string, E
∗ is the
Symmetric encryption algorithm with K(•), Pvc is the password of all
voters and Cs ENK protocol, Pavi is the password of Vi and As ENK
protocol, EPvc [∗] is executing the ENK protocol with Pvc and EPavi is
executing the ENK protocol with Pavi .
Then A decrypts E∗Kva [IDi] with Kva to get IDi. If IDi exits in the
database, A refuses to deliver the ballot to prevent Vi from repeating
voting. Otherwise, Vi chooses the corresponding Pavi according to IDi
to execute the ENK protocol with A. If IDi is not eligible, Vi does not
pass authentication.
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4. A stores Vi’ information into the database.
A puts the legal voters’ information (IDi, l, Vi) into the database, where
l is the entry of voter authentication. After authenticating all legal
voters, A gets a voters’ information table passing authentication as
shown in Table.3 and announces the ID of the authenticated voters.
So that voters know that they have passed authentication.
Entry Information of voters
identity sequence Voter’s identity
1 IDi Vi
...
...
...
l IDk Vk
...
...
...
n IDt Vt
Table 3: voters’ information table passing authentication
Phase III: Delivering ballot
In this phase, A helps voters to deliver their ballots anonymously. At
first, A performs an ID substitution operation one by one, which is used to
hide the identity of the voters. Next, A sends the ballot information with
replaced ID to C. Finally the ballot is delivered to C through the middleman
A. We also take Vi as an example, then the steps in delivering ballot phase
are as follows:
1. A performs an ID substitution operation.
When A helps Vi to deliver ballot, the IDi of Vi is replaced by IDj and
the ballot is delivered in the j-th order. At this point, only A knows
ID substitution table, even if C sees ID , C does not know the specific
corresponding voter identity. The ID substitution table as shown in
Table 4.
2. The ballot is delivered to C through the middleman A.
In this step, A delivers the encrypted ballot information to C. After
substitution, Vi’ encrypted ballot matches with IDj. Due to double
encryption, A cannot transmit the encrypted to C through a round of
12
Identity sequence Relevant information after replacement
Entry Replaced identity sequence
IDk 1 ID1
...
...
...
IDi j IDj
...
...
...
IDt n IDn
Table 4: ID substitution table
ENK communication. A acts as an intermediary to create anonymous
interactive communications between voters and C.
In these anonymous interactive communications, double encryption of
the Vi’ encrypted ballot information changes. The outer layer is chang-
ing with the both sides of communication. When the both sides of com-
munication are A and C, the outer layer is constant that is encrypted
by Pvc using the ENK communication between A and C. When the
both sides of communication are Vi and C, the outer layer is replaced
by Pavi using the ENK communication between Vi and C. In addition,
the inner layer encrypted by Pvc is fixed. These anonymous interactive
communications is as follows:
A→ C : (E∗Kac[IDj ], EPac[EPvc [Y
acvi
i ]]) ;
C → A : (E∗Kac [IDj], EPac [EPvc [Y
acvibcvi
i ]]) ;
A→ Vi : ((E
∗
Kva
[IDi], EPavi [EPvc [Y
acvibcvi
i ]]) ;
Vi → A : ((E
∗
Kva
[IDi], EPavi [EPvc [Y
bcvi
i ]]) ;
A→ C : ((E∗Kac[IDj ], EPac[EPvc [Y
bcvi
i ]]) ;
where, these anonymous interactive Cs’ principles are similar. We take
(E∗Kac[IDj ], EPac[EPvc [Y
acvi
i ]]) as an example between communication
A and C. Where EKac(∗) is a symmetric encryption algorithm with
encryption and decryption keyKac. Then C decrypts withKac and gets
Vi’s replaced identity string IDj . Thus, C checks whether voters repeat
voting. After that A and C use the password Pac and execute the ENK
protocol to transfer the Vi’ encrypted ballot information. When C gets
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Y
acvi
i , C adds bcvi to the Vi’ encrypted ballot information to encrypt the
inner layer as the ENK protocol in Sect.2. Then the information that
has been attached to bcvi is sent to A by C. The rest communications
are similar to it.
Phase IV: Publishing ballot
In this phase, C announces the valid ballot received and the voting result.
First, C checks whether the ballot is legal and the ballot has been tampered
with. Every time a valid ballot is received by C, it is recorded on the bulletin
board. After C receives all ballots, C will announce the bulletin board and
the voting result. The publishing ballot phase is implementing as follows:
1. C checks the validity of the ballot.
We can take Vi as an example. C receives Yi from Vi, which consisted of
Xi and hkvc(Xi). Meanwhile, C could receive replaced ID sequence IDj .
Firstly, C uses Kvc to reconstruct h
′
kvc
(Xi), which is the reconstructed
MAC. If h
′
kvc
(Xi) isn’t equal to hkvc(Xi), it proves that the message has
been tampered. Otherwise, C extracts hKva(Bi‖Si). Then C extracts
Bi and Si. The next is that C verifies if Si has been received. After
the verification, if Bi ∈ L, C considers the ballot valid and counts it.
Finally, C records Bi, Si, hKva(Bi‖Si) into Publishing ballot information
table.
2. C will announce the bulletin board and the voting result.
Every time a valid ballot is received by C, it is recorded on the bul-
letin board shown as Table 5. After all the votes of n voters have been
dealt with, C counts and publishes the voter’s verification string and
the success of the ballot result. In addition, C also publishes the re-
placed ID number which is replaced by A for voters who did not vote
successfully,. Thus, both A and Vi can know whether Vi voted success-
fully. For each voter who did not vote successfully, A creates a new
series of keys ID
′
j, P
′
avi
and helps them to make a new round of vot-
ing. When all the ballots are counted, announces the voting results and
Bi, Si, hKva(Bi‖Si). Through the MAC of ballot and string hKva(Bi‖Si),
voters can check if their votes are counted correctly and administrator
can supervise C to prevent ballots from being tampered with.
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Entry Ballot Verification string MAC of ballot and string
1 Bk Sk hKva(Bk‖Sk)
2 Bi Si hKva(Bi‖Si)
...
...
...
...
n Bt St hKva(Bt‖St)
Table 5: Publishing ballot information
4. Security analysis
In this section, we are to discuss the security properties of the voting
scheme. The voting scheme based on the physical laws reaches the post-
quantum security and voting scheme criteria. The unreusability can be en-
sured, because each party of the voting scheme has his own recorded database
to prevent replay attacks in each phase. Meanwhile, the eligibility can be
ensured, because one party needs to confirm the other legal identity before
communication. In addition, our scheme has universal verification, because
all ballots and voting result can be verified by three parties of the scheme.
The above properties are easier to prove. Meanwhile, there is no mention of
security property, such as privacy and robustness. In our scheme they are
promised by the security of the ENK protocol based on physical laws, so
we also focus on analyzing them. In addition, we also demonstrate that the
scheme achieves the others properties necessary for voting scheme in detail.
Completeness. The completeness means that all the valid ballots must be
counted correctly when all parties of the scheme are honest. The complete-
ness is obviously satisfied if the voters, the administrator A and counter C
execute the scheme honestly.
Robustness. The robustness means that the dishonest parties of the scheme
or outsiders cannot disrupt the voting scheme. The abnormal behaviors will
be found, including communication terminated between any two parties and
invalid messages delivered. We demonstrate the robustness when one party
of the scheme or outsider wants to disrupt the scheme.
When a voter Ve is dishonest, there will be the following two cases: refus-
ing to communicating with A or C and sending an invalid ballot. In the first
case, A and C do not think it is normal that the numbers of voters voting in
the scheme is less than the total number of voters. For example, during the
authentication and voting phase, the voter Ve refuses to communicate with
A after obtaining the password Pavi. Aw could examine the communication
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numbers that obtains the password before the next phase. Thus, Aw will
find out the abnormal behavior of the voters Vi. In the second case, Ve sends
an invalid ballot Be(Be 6⊆ B) to C. Since C verifies the legality of the ballot
information Be before recording the ballot. If the ballot information is valid
(Be ∈ ℓ), C considers that the ballot is valid and counts the ballot Be. If not,
she can refuse to receive the ballot from the dishonest voter and Ve’ invalid
ballot is not recorded in the bulletin board.
When a administrator Ae is dishonest, there will be the following two
cases: refusing to communicate with C or sending changed encrypted ballot
information. In the first case, similarly, C can find the abnormal behavior
if she does not receive the messages from Ae. In the second case, Ae sends
changed encrypted ballot information to C, not original message. Because
Ae does not know the key Kvc, which is shared by all voters and C. She
do not create a valid message due to the unforgeability of MAC. After the
decryption, C gets a random string. The probability of randomly generating
a valid string is negligible because the length of Si is so big. Therefore, Ae’s
abnormal behavior is found out.
Then, when a counter Ce is dishonest, She makes trouble on the bulletin
board which consists of Bi, Si, hKva(Bi‖Si)(1 ≤ i ≤ n) . Due to hKva(Bi),
administrator A can supervise C to prevent ballots from being tampered
with.
Finally, the outsiders who want to disrupt the scheme terminate the com-
munication between any two parties of our scheme or tamper with the en-
crypted ballot information. It is similar to the above mentioned analysis. So,
the outsiders’ abnormal behavior also is found out.
Privacy. The privacy means that the content of the ballot is invisible to
others except for the voter and C. In other words, the content and the
voter’s identity cannot be matched. In our voting scheme, we ensure the
privacy based on the physical laws, which can resist the quantum adversaries.
In this scheme it can be assumed that administrator A and counter C are
independent parties, i.e., they will not collaborate on tracking ballots.
First, we briefly discuss that the participants of our scheme are dishonest
as the following two cases. One case is that privacy still exists when the
administrator A is dishonest. It is clear that A knows the identity of voters
but can not see the ballot due to the double encryption. The other case is
that that counter Ce is dishonest. Ce can only know Bi‖hKva(Bi), but does
not know the sender’s identity. She can not match Bi with Vi’s identity.
Next, we demonstrate that when there exits an outsider Eve, the secu-
16
rity of privacy is post-quantum secure. Any attacker wants to track ballots,
which breaks the privacy. However, the privacy of our scheme based on the
physical laws is equal to the security of the ENK protocol, since any informa-
tion about voter identity and ballot is transmitted through the ENK protocol
in the channel. Because the ENK protocol has post-quantum security, the
privacy of our scheme is post-quantum. Specifically, If an attacker wants
to track the ballot and break the privacy of our scheme, she must decrypt
the communication in the channel encrypted with Pavi , Pca, and Pcv. Be-
cause each voter Vi encrypted ballot information is double-encrypted, we can
take the outer layer of double encryption in communication between A and
C as an example. If Eve wants to get the messages of the communication,
EPac [EPvc [Y
acvi
i ]] , she can conduct key-guessing attack (aac and bac are ran-
dom numbers generated by the communication parties in the ENK protocol
in Sect.2):
1. Eve chooses a candidate password and decrypts the messages.
Eve randomly generates a candidate password P
′
acthen uses it to de-
crypt the messages of the channel and obtains
((EPvc[Y
acvi
i ])
aac)
′
, ((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
bac)
′
and ((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
aacbac)
′
;
2. Eve extracts the random numbers generated by the communication
parties.
Then he uses ((EPvc[Y
acvi
i ])
bac)
′
, ((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
aacbac)
′
to extract a
′
ac and
((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
bac)
′
, ((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
aacbac)
′
to extract b
′
ac;
3. Eve gets the final messages after decryption.
Finally, he calculates ((((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
′
)a
′
ac)−1 and ((((EPvc [Y
acvi
i ])
bac)
′
)b
′
ac)−1
He verifies whether the candidate password P
′
ci is correct by checking
whether ((((EPvc[Y
acvi
i ])
aac)
′
)a
′
ac)−1 is equal to ((((EPvc[Y
acvi
i ])
bac)
′
)b
′
ac)−1. It
is obvious that the computational complexity of this attack depends on the
length of password Pac . For each candidate P
′
ac, Eve has to solve the dis-
crete logarithm problem. As the ENK protocol with post-quantum security
in Sect.2, the quantum adversary must solve the algorithm 287 times on av-
erage when the length of password P is 88, which is beyond the maximum
computational power of the attacker within the effective attack duration.
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Eligibility. Eligibility means that only eligible voters are allowed to vote.
As stated in the authentication and voting phase, the identity of the voter
Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) who applied for the voting are verified by administrator. Only
eligible voters can be authenticated to access the delivering ballot phase. If
an ineligible voter Ve wants to vote successfully, she impersonates an eligible
voter Vi in the authentication and voting phase. However Ve doesn’t get the
valid IDi and the communication key by eavesdropping the channel due to
the ENK protocol with post-quantum security.
Unreusability. Unreusability means that each eligible voter cannot vote
successfully twice. In our scheme, each party of the voting scheme has his
own recorded database to prevent replay attacks in each phase. Specifically,
in the authentication and voting phase, A can verify whether voters ap-
ply repeatedly based on the voters information table passing authentication,
namely Table.3. In the publishing ballot phase, C verifies whether they have
received repeated votes from the same voter by Si of publishing ballot infor-
mation table, namely Table.5. As a result, it is impossible for each eligible
voter who holds the voting right to repeat voting.
Fairness. Fairness means that nothing can affect the voting, especially that
the counting of ballots does not affect the voting. That means that the ballot
information will not be leaked until the result is published. In the scheme,
the authentication and voting phase is done after the authentication phase,
and C will not disclose the intermediate result of the voting scheme to others
before the whole scheme is completed. Therefore the previous voters will not
affect the subsequent voters. The scheme is fair for all voters.
Verifiability. Verifiability means that an eligible voter can verify that his
ballot has been correctly counted or not. In addition, our scheme ensures
universal verifiability, which shows all ballots and voting result can be ver-
ified by three parties of the scheme. In publishing ballot phase, C pub-
lishes the publishing ballot information table which consists of Bi, Si and
hKva(Bi‖Si) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Vi can locate his own verification string Si in
Table.5 and verify the corresponding ballot information is correct or not.
All voters and A who own Kva could check the validity of the ballot by
HKva(Bi‖Si). C can check ballots’ validity by verifying whether Bi ∈ B.
Therefore all participates in the scheme can check whether the voting result
is normally counted.
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5. Discussion
The post-quantum security of the proposed scheme that can resist quan-
tum computers is based on the physical laws. In the voting scheme, we use
the ENK protocol to transmit messages in the channel. From the [29], the
ENK protocol with post-quantum security is to resist the quantum com-
puter driven by typical coherent fields based on the ion-trap. From the [34],
it mainly analyzes the permitted logic depth of quantum computer driven
by coherent fields. From the [29], the authors specifically analyze whether
the quantum algorithm is able to perform reliably if the logical depth of
the quantum algorithm is within the permitted logic depth. In our voting
scheme, we use the ENK protocol with post-quantum security based on the
physical laws, which cannot be attacked in the ion-trap quantum computing
environment. In future, we can move on to extend the scope of our research
to explore the security of voting scheme in quantum computing environments
such as cavity quantum electrodynamics.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a voting scheme with post-quantum security
based the physical laws. The advantages of our scheme are as follows. First,
the post-quantum security of the voting scheme is based on the physical laws,
which depends on the inherent limitations of quantum computers. Due to
the inherent limitations, the security is not influenced by the evolution of
new quantum algorithms. Second, some generic cryptographic components,
which consist of the lightweight password, the symmetric algorithm and the
unconditional secure MAC, are applied in the scheme making the scheme
easier to implement in practice. Third, the scheme is based on the quantum
computer physical limitation reaching all the post-quantum security proper-
ties. Finally, we emphasize the point that the presented scheme based on the
viewpoint -“active defense” is a superior and productive research direction.
we emphasize that the use of the practical post-quantum security based on
physical laws to achieve a voting scheme should be an attractive and fruitful
research approach. We look forward to further research in this direction of
work.
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